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ANTITRUST

LAW-AN

ILLUSORY

EXPANSION

STANDING UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON

Sonotone Corp., 442

U.S.
I.

OF

CONSUMER

ACT-Reiter v.

330 (1979).
INTRODUCTION

"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antit~st laws may sue
therefor in any district court. . . ."1 This section of the Clayton Act
appears to grant a broad right of redress to those injured by viola
tions of the antitrust laws. rhe courts have recognized, however,
that although an antitrust violation injures many as it ripples
through the economy, not all those who are injured have the right
to seek redress. Consequently, the courts have used restrictive in
terpretations of the words found in section 4 to limit the standing
of those seeking the treble damage remedy.
Before 1977, a consumer who paid an inflated price for a com
modity because of the illegal actions of the manufacturer was able
to seek redress under section 4: This remedy was available
whether the consumer had purchased the commodity directly from
the manufacturer or indirectly, through a retail outlet. This
changed in 1977 when the United States Supreme Court decided
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. 2 That case defined the word "injured"
in section 4 by holding that only persons who purchased directly
from the antitrust violator were injured within the meaning of sec
tion 4. 3 Since most consumers make their purchases indirectly
through intermediaries, the direct purchaser rule of Illinois Brick
effectively bars consumer actions for the treble damage remedy.
In 1979, in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. ,4 the Supreme Court was
faced with the question of whether a consumer, injured by paying
more than she would have in the absence of antitrust violations,
was injured within the meaning of the section 4 term "business or
property."5 Ignoring the impact of the direct purchaser rule of Illi
nois Brick, the Court held that such consumer injuries were within
the protection of section 4 and granted standing. 6 This note will ex
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as § 4 of the Clayton Act]. See
also note 28 infra.
2. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
3. [d. at 746.
4. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
5. [d. at 338.
6. [d. at 342.
81
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amine the conflict between Illinois Brick and Reiter, the congres
sional intent regarding consumer standing under section 4, and the
resulting practical significance of the Reiter holding.

II.

THE CASE

On May 2, 1975, Kathleen Reiter sued Sonotone COrp.7 and
four other manufacturing firms 8 under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. 9 Sonotone manufactured the hearing aid which Reiter pur
chased from a dealer representative. 1o She alleged that Sonotone
had violated the antitrust laws l l by controlling the price at which
hearing aids could be sold to consumers.12 Reiter sought redress
for the injury she incurred by paying a higher price for the hearing
aid than she would have paid in the absence of any alleged anti
trust violation. 13 The defendants moved for dismissal of Reiter's
suit claiming she lacked standing. 14
The issue raised by Sonotone's motion for dismissal was
whether section 4 of the Clayton Act, which requires an injury to
business or property,15 encompassed only injuries to commercial or
business interests. 16 Sonotone argued that Reiter's injury, one suf
fered by a consumer who had been forced to pay a higher price for
goods purchased for personal use, was outside the protection of
section 4 since it was not of a commercial nature. 17

7. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933 (D. Minn. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d
1077 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 442 U.S. 330 (1979). Reiter sought to'rep
resent the class of all persons who had purchased hearing aids manufactured by one
of the five defendants. ld. at 934.
8. The other four firms were Beltone Electronics Corporation, Dahlberg Elec
tronics, Inc., Textron Incorporated, and Radioear Corporation.
9. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
10. 435 F. Supp. at 934.
11. Specifically, Reiter claimed the defendants had:
restricted the territories, customers, and brands of hearing aids offered by
their retail dealers, used the customer lists of their retail dealers for their
own purposes, prohibited unauthorized retailers from dealing in or repairing
their hearing aids, and conspired among themselves and with their retail
dealers to fix the retail prices of the hearing aids.
442 U.S. at 335 n.1.
12. 435 F. Supp. at 934.
13. ld.
14. All defendants except Sonotone, who did not appear in any proceeding be
fore the district court, moved for dismissal. Id.
15. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
16. 435 F. Supp. at 935.
17. ld.
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Judge Larson of the United States District Court for Minne
sota granted standing to Reiter.lS Judge Larson held that Reiter
suffered injury to her business or property within the meaning of
section 4. 19 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir
cuit reversed the lower court's holding and denied standing. 20 The
Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Burger writing for the majority,
held that Reiter's injury, that of a consumer who had paid an ille
gally higher price for goods purchased for personal use, was pro
tected by section 4. 21 The Court then remanded the case to the
district court for further proceedings. 22
Reiter succeeded in bringing consumer interests within
the business or property language of section 4 of the Clayton Act.
During the appeal of the case, however, the Supreme Court
decided Illinois Brick, which held that only a direct purchaser
is injured within the meaning of section 4. 23 Reiter, an indirect
purchaser since she bought her hearing aid from a retailer and
not from the manufacturer,24 will be denied standing on remand
under the Illinois Brick rule. Because of the apparent conflict
between Illinois Brick and Reiter, resort must be made to the con
gressional position on standing under section 4. This note will ex
amine that position as well as explain its impact on the Reiter
holding.

III.

BACKGROUND

The Sherman and Clayton Acts
Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890 to prohibit monopo
lies, attempts to monopolize, and all agreements in restraint oftrade. 25

A.

18. Id. at 938.
19. Id.
20. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d at 1087.
21. 442 U.S. at 339.
22. Id. at 345.
23. 431 U.S. at 746.
24. 435 F. Supp. at 934.
25. The Sherman Act, ch. 647,26 Stat. 209 (1890), provided in part:
SEC. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... , is hereby declared to be
illegal. ...
SEC. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
... , shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor....
SEC. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
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In response to the merger movement of 1897-1904,26 and because
the Sherman Act was ineffectual in reaching certain other anticom
petitive forms of conduct,27 the Clayton Act was passed in 1914 to
amend the Sherman Act. 28
any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared
to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor ... and shall recover three fold
the damages ....
26. A. AUSTIN, ANTITRUST: LAW, ECONOMICS, POLICY 3-4 (1976).
27. The Sherman Act was ineffectual in reaching tying arrangements, exclusive
dealings, price discrimination, and secret rebates. Lack of enforcement and prosecu
tion as well as the unresponsiveness of the judicial system were also considered to
be problems of the Sherman Act. [d.
28. The Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified in scattered sections
of 15, 29 U.S.C.). The purpose of the Act, as stated by its sponsors, was to "make un
lawful certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and in themselves, are not cov
ered by the [Sherman Act]...." S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). The
Clayton Act provides in part:
SEC. 2. That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce
... to discriminate in price between different purchasers ... , where the ef
fect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce [or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who. either grants or knowingly re
ceives the benefit of such discrimination... ].
(Bracketed portion contains language added by the Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L.
No. 74-692, ch. 592,49 Stat. 1526 (1936)).
SEC. 3. [I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... ,
to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods ... , or fix a price char
ged therefor ... , on the condition ... that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor ... of the lessor or
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract ... may be to substan
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com
merce.
Because § 7 of the Sherman Act limited the treble damage remedy to those injured
by a violation of the Sherman Act alone, it was amended by the Clayton Act. The
Clayton Act gives the remedy to those injured by any violation of the antitrust laws:
SEC. 4. [A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant re
sides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in contro
versy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee ....
SEC. 7. That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire ... any
part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation [and no corpo
ration ... shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corpo
ration ... where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly].
(Bracketed portion contains language added by the Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L.
No. 74-692, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)).
SEC. 8. [This section prohibits any person from being a director in two
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The primary purpose of the Sherman Act and its amendments
was to prevent restraints of trade which lessen free and full compe
tition. 29 Congress recognized the benefits of a free market3° and
intended only to regulate those acts which prevented the inde
pendent operation of the marketplace. 31 In effectuating the legisla
tive aim of protecting free and full competition, Congress 'chose
or more corporations, anyone of which has a capital and surplus of more
than one million dollars] if such corporations are or shall have been thereto
fore, by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors....
29. The initial resolution adopted by the Senate, which started the legislative
process, directed the Committee on Finance to inquire into and report:
[S]uch measures as it may deem expedient to set aside, control, restrain
or prohibit all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations
between persons or corporations, made with a view, or which tend to pre
vent free and full competition ... , with such penalties and provisions ... as
will tend to preserve freedom of trade and production, the natural competi
tion of increasing production, the lowering of prices by such competition....
19 CONGo REC. 6041 (1888). See generally M. FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE
CONSUMER (ENFORCEMENT) 32-170 (1956).
30. D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 7-24 (1959). Economic
analysis suggests that the benefits of a free market are decreased prices with in
creased supply, increased technology and innovation, efficient production and distri
bution, and efficient resource allocation.
Competition also tends toward desired social goals. Because the private deci
sions of individual buyers and sellers in the marketplace determine economic factors
such as price, level of production, allocation of resources, distribution, and technol
ogy, there is less need for governmental intervention. Since the free market dis
perses private power, there is also less need for governmental regulation. To the ex
tent that this lessens the impact of special interest groups on the legislative process,
the democratic system is improved.
31. The combinations prohibited by the Act were those: "made with a view to
prevent competition," 21 CONGo REC. 2462 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman); which
"control prices," id. at 2471 (remarks of Sen. Allison); made "to limit production" for
"the purpose of destroying competition," id. at 2558 (remarks of Sen. Pugh); "that ef
fect the price of commodities," id. at 2609 (remarks of Sen. Morgan),
Senator Platt, a critic, commented that the Act proceeds on the assumption that
"competition is beneficient to the country." [d. at 3147.
See generally 21 CONGo REC. 2457-61 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman); id. at
2729 (remarks of Sen. Platt); id. at 4089 (remarks of Rep. Culbertson).
When the Act was attacked as too expansive, supporters explained that mergers
which would enable the new enterprise to compete more effectively with larger en
terprises would not be impeded. The merger of two small competitors in an industry
characterized by large competitors would not be barred. 95 CONGo REC. 11,486,
11,488, 11,506 (1949); 96 CONGo REC. 16,436 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 6-8 (1949); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950), The merger of
one bankrupt firm with a financially healthy one would not be prohibited. 96 CONGo
REC. 16,435, 16,444 (1950); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950); H.R.
REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
The agreement by Congress concerning this purpose of the Act was noted by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Standard Oil CO. V. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
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language32 which would allow enforcement of the law,33 deterrence
of antitrust violations,34 and encouragement of suits by individuals. 35
B.

Standing

In considering the scope of standing, reference first must be
made to the United States Constitution. The Constitution limits
the federal courts' jurisdiction to cases and controversies. 36 This
language has been interpreted to require that the dispute be adju
dicated in an adversarial context and in a form historically viewed
as capable of judicial resolution. 37 To meet the first requirement,
32. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (as amended by the Clayton
Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)). See notes 25 & 28 supra and accompanying
text.
33. The House debates show such an intent. See generally 51 CONGo REC.
16,274-75 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb); id. at 16,317-19 (remarks of Rep. Floyd).
Senate debates reflected no discussion of the enforcement value of the treble dam
age remedy. This was in spite of attacks on the Bill regarding its lack of meaningful
sanctions. See, e.g., 51 CONGo REc. 15,818-21 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Reed); id. at
16,042-46 (remarks of Sen. Norris). See also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. V. Interna
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Lawlor v. National Screen Servo Corp.,
349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954).
34. Treble damages of § 4 of the Clayton Act were provided in part for punitive
purposes. 21 CONGo REc. 3147 (1914) (remarks of Sen. George). See also Fortner En
terprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) (developer
granted standing to sue for lost profits caused by construction of pre-fabricated
homes which was a condition of financing provided by manufacturer's subsidiary);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (com
mon law doctrine of in pari delicto held inapplicable as defense in suit by licensed
operators against the corporation granting them the licenses for antitrust violations
arising out of their agreement).
35. The treble damages of § 4 of the Clayton Act were provided to offset "the
difficulty of maintaining a private suit against a combination such as is described" in
the Act. 21 CONGo REc. 2456 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
Debates accompanying § 7 of the Sherman Act, which first provided for the
treble damage remedy, showed that the remedy was intended for "[tlhe people of
the United States as individuals." 21 CONGo REc. 1767-68 (1890) (remarks of Sen.
George). See also 21 CONGo REc. 2612 (1890) (remarks of Sens. Teller and Reagan);
id. at 2615 (remarks of Sen. Coke).
When amended by § 4 of the Clayton Act, debates showed that it was intended
to "open the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who
violate the antitrust laws, and give the injured party ample damages for the wrong
suffered." 51 CONGo REc. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb). See, e.g., 51 CONGo
REc. 9079 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Volstead); id. at 9270 (remarks of Rep. Carlin). See
also Brunswick Corp. V. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977) (loss
of anticipated earnings caused by acquisition of bankrupt competitor held not to be
within protection of antitrust laws even though acquisition was a violation).
36. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2.
37. Association of Data Processing Servo Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 151-52 (1970) (association of data processors granted standing to seek judicial re
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that there be an adversarial context, the parties must allege an ad
verse interest in the cause of action or in the subject matter of the
controversy.38 The interest alleged may not be remote or inciden
tal. Such an interest may be aesthetic, recreational, or conserva
tional, as well as economic. 39
The second requirement, that the case be capable of judicial
resolution, is met by alleging that the granting of relief will result
in a benefit to the party bringing the action. 4o As with the interest
alleged in the cause of action, the benefit to be gained from
bringing the cause of action may be aesthetic, conservational, or
recreational, as well as economic. 41 By examining the requirements
of an interest in the cause of action and a benefit to be gained, the
courts are able to allocate scarce judicial resources to cases worthy
of adjudication.

C.

Standing and Section 4

Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person injured
in his business or property by reason of an antitrust violation may
sue for treble damages. 42 The broad scope of section 4,43 however,
may allow the litigation of negligible, highly speculative, and re
mote claims. 44 Such claims may be brought by plaintiffs who al
leged an injury in order to coerce settlement through a defendant's
fear of the treble damage award allowed by the Clayton Act. This
view of Comptroller of Currency's decision that national banks could provide data
processing services).
38. Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 395 (1915); Standard Stock Food Co.
v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 550 (1912); Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108, 114 (1904).
39. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (responsible representative of listening public granted standing
as party in interest in hearing before FCC); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference
v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965) (conservation group with interests in aes
thetic, conservational, and recreational impact of FPC ruling granted standing to
seek review).
40. Falvey v. Foreman-State Nat'l Bank, 101 F.2d 409, 416 (7th Cir. 1939)
(shareholders of bank denied standing to sue on behalf of bank which had assigned
cause of action to another bank).
41. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
42. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
43. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) (ex
clusive selling agency created by coal producers to mitigate existing evils in industry
and foster competition held not in derogation of antitrust laws although incidental ef
fect on prices would result).
44. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (shareholder of
photographic supply house forced out of business by defendant's alleged illegal con
duct held not to have standing since injury was to corporation).

88

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:81

concern has increased with development of multi-level distribution
systems in business which are characterized by middlemen sep
arating the manufacturers and ultimate consumers in the chain of
distribution. The separation of the injured party from the antitrust
violator aggravates the problem of proof of damages. 45
To resolve these conflicts, the courts have used the standing
doctrine to limit the suits capable of being brought under section
4. By restrictive interpretations of the words found in section
4, the courts have limited the interests protected by the statute
and, consequently, the right to standing. This judicial activity has
centered around the meaning of, and the interests protected by,
the words "person," "injured," "business or property," and "by
reason of. "46
D.

Standing for Indirect Purchasers

Before 1977, the Supreme Court had not directly addressed
the question of the standing of consumers who were indirect pur
chasers, that is, persons who purchased goods from retailers in
stead of directly from the alleged antitrust violator. In 1977 the
Court decided Illinois Brick and held that only direct purchasers,
and not others in the chain of distribution, were injured within the
meaning of section 4.47 The case involved the State of Illinois, to
gether with 700 governmental bodies, suing manufacturers of ce
ment blocks for selling the blocks at higher prices due to an al
leged price conspiracy.48 The cement blocks had been sold by the
manufacturers to contractors who, after successfully bidding on
construction projects, had incorporated the blocks into buildings
which then had been sold to the plaintiffs. 49 Consequently, the
plaintiffs were indirect purchasers, and the success of their cause of
action depended on proving that the contractors had passed on to
them the Illinois Brick Company's illegal overcharges.
To properly understand the Illinois Brick ruling, consideration
must first be given to Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machin
ery Corp. 50 That case involved a section 4 action brought by a
45. Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 331, 332
(1974).
46. See Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section Four of the
Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964).
47. 431 U.S. at 746.
48. Id. at 726.

49. Id.
50.

392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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manufacturer of shoes to recover illegal overcharges from the man
ufacturer of its shoe machinery. 51 In defense, the shoe machinery
manufacturer sought to show that the plaintiff had not been injured
in its business as required by section 4. The defendant claimed
that the illegal overcharges had been passed on in the form of
higher shoe prices to the plaintiff's customers.52 Under the defend
ant's theory the illegal overcharge was absorbed by the plaintiff's
customers, indirect purchasers of the defendant's shoe machinery,
and that they were the actual injured party. 53
The Court held that the direct purchaser alone, here the shoe
manufacturer, was injured by the full amount of the illegal over
charge. 54 The Court was unwilling to complicate section 4 actions
by tracing the effects of overcharges on prices, costs, sales, and
profits. 55 Second, if antitrust violators were allowed to defend with
the argument that overcharges were passed on to others in the
chain of distribution, section 4 actions would devolve on consumers
with minuscule damages and little interest in bringing suit. De
fendants would, therefore, potentially be able to keep the fruits of
their illegal actions. 56.
The Illinois Brick Court was trapped by the Hanover Shoe de
cision. The. Justices saw their options as either overruling Hanover
Shoe or applying the decision to both plaintiffs and defendants
equally. 57 In deciding upon the latter course, they also adopted the
Hanover Shoe reasoning that to do otherwise would overly compli
cate section 4 actions with convoluted theories of proof. 58 The Il
linois Brick Court also reasoned that if indirect purchasers were
allowed to establish their .cases by attempts to prove that illegal
overcharges had been passed on to them by direct purchasers, de
fendants would be exposed to multiple liability. 59 This would result
since under Hanover Shoe the direct purchaser had standing to sue
for treble damages as well.
Although Illinois Brick was decided before the Reiter appeal
arrived before the Supreme Court, the direct purchaser rule,

51.

52.

53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.
59.

Id. at 484.
Id. at 487-88.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 492-93.
Id. at 494.
431 U.S. at 729.
Id. at 737.
Id.
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which would have denied Reiter standing, was not raised since the
issue had not been addressed by the lower courts. 60 Any decision
promulgated with regard to the business or property language of
section 4 would therefore be subject to the direct purchaser rule of
Illinois Brick.

IV.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

In ruling on Sonotone's motion to dismiss for lack of standing,
the Supreme Court had to resolve the question of whether Reiter's
injury, that of paying a higher price for goods due to antitrust vio
lations, was an injury to business or property.61 The Court first
found that canons of statutory construction mandated an interpreta
tion of "business or property" that would give effect to the disjunc
tive "or. "62 Since the Clayton Act had been held to be comprehen
sive in its terms and coverage,63 the Court gave "property" its
naturally broad and inclusive meaning64 and held that paying an il
legally high price was an injury to property. 65
The Court also relied on two cases to support its decision. 66
The first, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta,67 held
that an injury to property included the injury incurred by a city
when it was led to pay higher prices in the marketplace for pipes
used in its waterworks. 68 lhe Chattanooga Foundry Court rea
soned that if the term "business or property" were restricted to
commercial interests, the word "property" would become meaning
less since business and commerce are identical. 69 The Reiter Court
explained Chattanooga Foundry as being based solely on the city's
position as a consumer in the marketplace. 70 Since the city had re
course to the courts for redress of the injury it incurred by paying
60.
61.

442 U.S. at 337 n.3.
Id. at 334.
62. Id. at 338.
63. Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968);
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)
(California sugar refiners' agreement to pay uniform price for sugar beets held to be
within proscription of Sherman Act since sugar was sold in interstate commerce).
64. "Property" was defined by the Court as comprehending anything of mate
rial value. 442 U.S. at 338. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC
TIONARY 1818 (1976).
65. 442 U.S. at 342.
66. Id. at 339-42.
67. 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
68. [d. at 396.
69. Id. at 397.
70. 442 U.S. at 342.
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an illegally higher price for its pipes, it followed that Reiter had a
similar right and that property must be found to include the con
sumer's interest. 71
The second case relied on by the Reiter Court, Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co. of California,72 involved alleged conspiracies in
restraint of trade and attempts to monopolize the distribution of re
fined petroleum products in Hawaii. 73 The Hawaii Court held that
Hawaii did not have standing to sue as parens patriae on behalf of
its citizens for injuries to its general economy.74 In the course of its
decision, the Court stated that "business or property" referred only
to commercial interests. or enterprises. 75 The Reiter Court ex
plained this language by reasoning that "commercial interests" was
used only as a generic reference to the interests of Hawaii as a
party to a commercial transaction. 76 The Court further explained
that such a result was mandated by dicta in the case which stated
that Hawaii would have a cause of action as a consumer in the
marketplace if an injury was incurred through payment wrongfully
induced. 77
The Court concluded with a discussion of the legislative his
tory of the Clayton Act. The Justices first pointed out that the
discussions surrounding passage of the Act shed little light on the
meaning of "business or property. "78 The Court, however, did rec
ognize that the right of a consumer to bring such an action for
damages was never questioned. 79 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 80 was also cited for its examination of the legisla
tive history of the Act. 81 Brunswick found the Clayton Act to be a
remedy for the people of the United States as individuals 82 and,
71. [d. at 340.
72. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
73. Id. at 265.
74. [d.
75. Id. at 264.
76. 442 U.S. at 341-42.
77. [d. at 342.
78. [d. at 342 n.4 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251
(1972»; Weinberg v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(retail purchasers of clothing sold at artificially high prices held not to have suffered
an injury to "business or property"); I.P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
(1978); M. FORKOSCH, supra note 29; Note, CLosing the Door on Consumer Antitrust
Standing, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237 (1979).
79. 442 U.S. at 343.
80. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
81. 442 U.S. at 343.
82. 429 U.S. at 486. See also note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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therefore, that the Act supported a broad reading of "business or
property. "83
Although an expansive reading of "business or property"
would give standing to a larger group of potential litigants and
therefore would increase the burden on the federal courts, the
Court reasoned that this interpretation of the statute must be ac
cepted. 84 Any increase in demand on judicial resources would be
met by resources supplied by Congress. 85 The potentially ruinous
effect on small business that might occur because of the costs asso
ciated with increased litigation was dismissed as more properly
within the province of Congress to resolve. 86

V.

ANALYSIS

Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of
"business or property" broadly to include Reiter's consumer injury,
absent the overruling of Illinois Brick, Reiter will be defeated on
remand. This result is mandated since Reiter was an indirect pur
chaser, having bought from a retailer,87 and therefore falls squarely
within the direct purchaser rule of Illinois Brick. The remaining
question is whether such an outcome is consistent with the con
gressional interpretation of standing for indirect purchasers.
The congressional interpretation of standing for indirect pur
chasers is found in the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. 88 The
Act created no new substantive liability for antitrust violators.89 In
stead, it created a new procedure whereby state attorneys general
could sue antitrust violators on behalf of injured citizens. 9o Since
the Act was only procedural in nature, Congress' view of liability
under the Act was also its interpretation of liability under section 4
of the Clayton Act. Some commentators, quoting the Act,91 suggest
83.

442 U.S. at 344.

84.
85.

[d.
[d.

86. [d. at 344-45.
87. 435 F. Supp. at 934.
88. Pub. L. No. 94-435, tit. III, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976) (codified in scattered sec
tions of 15 U.S.C.).
89. H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2572, 2578.
90.

91.

[d.

S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1976) provided in part:
A direct cause of action is granted the States to avoid the inequities and
inconsistencies of restrictive judicial interpretations. . . . [This Act] is in
tended to assure that consumers are not precluded from the opportunity of
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that Congress' view was that the economic burden of most antitrust
violations was borne by the consumer and that the consumer
should have a remedy regardless of his ;remoteness from the anti
trust violator.92 Further support for this position can be found in
the bills submitted before Congress which would overrule Illinois
Brick and would grant standing to indirect purchasers. 93
In passing the Antitrust Improvements Act, however, Con
gress cited several cases as correctly stating the law in this area. 94
These cases are reconcilable with Illinois Brick and suggest that
Congress, like the Supreme Court, would generally deny indirect
purchasers standing. The In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,95 for
example, involved suits brought by governmental agencies to re
cover damages for injuries incurred through purchases of asphalt
from suppliers who allegedly engaged in price-fixing conspiracies. 96
Standing was granted although the plaintiffs were indirect purchas
ers, having purchased the. asphalt as part of road projects com
pleted by contractors through the bidding process. 97
The Liquid Asphalt court granted standing for two reasons.
First, proof of damages would not be an overly complex issue,98
proving their damage and to avoid problems with respect to manageability
[of class actions], standing, privity, target area, remoteness, and the like.
92. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 757 (Brennan, J., dis
senting); Note, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 230 (1977);
Note, Antitrust Law-Standing to Sue-Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 46 U. CIN. L.
REv. 875, 881-82 (1977); Note, Illinois Brick: An Abuse of Precedent to Circumvent
Congressional Intent, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 501, 517-18.
93. The initial efforts to overrule Illinois Brick attempted to do so by amending
§ 4 to read "any person who shall be injured in fact, directly, or indirectly, in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue. . . ." H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1874, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) (emphasis added).
Later efforts ·provided that "[a)ny purchaser or seller ... shall, upon proof of
payment ... , be deemed injured ... whether or not such purchaser or seller ...
dealt directly with the defendant." S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). S. 300 did
provide for a defense based on the passing on of any overcharges to others further
along the chain of distribution. The availability of such a defense was left to the dis
cretion of the court. Id.
94. The Act was patterned "after such innovative decisions as In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Master Key Litigation,
(1973) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 74,680 and (1975) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 60,377 (D.
Conn.); Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., [1975) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 60,295 (D. Ill.)
...." S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1976).
95. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
96. Id. at 194.
97. Id. at 199.
98. Id. at 195.
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despite the existence of intervening parties. This result was
reached because the bid submitted by a contractor contained the
,supplier's price with an amount added for labor, overhead, and
profit.99 Damages could be ascertained readily, therefore, from an
examination of the bid submitted.
Second, there was little chance of double recovery against the
suppliers.loo The possibility of double recovery was dismissed be
cause the contractors would not, in all likelihood, bring suit. Suits
would not be brought by the contractors since they were controlled
by the suppliers either directly through stock ownership or indi
rectly through credit arrangements. The running of the statute of
limitations and the probability that the contractors had earned a
percentage profit on the suppliers' overcharges also would serve to
lessen the chance of suit by the contractors. 101
A second case, similar in facts to Liquid Asphalt and also cited
by Congress for its decision on standing, was In re Master Key Lit
igation .102 This suit involved an alleged price-fixing conspiracy as
sociated with the distribution of building hardware such as locks,
latches, and keys.l03 Contractors purchased overpriced building
hardware from distributors and then resold it as part of finished
buildings. Although the governmental entities which purchased the
buildings were one level removed from the distributors who were
the antitrust violators, the court granted standing. l04
Like LiqUid Asphalt, the Master Key court offered two reasons
for its decision. First, damages could be ascertained readily since
the bids submitted to the plaintiffs were computed solely on a per
centage mark-up basis.l05 Under this method the profit earned by
the contractor was a percentage of the total costs incurred. Once
the percentage mark-up is known, the cost of any supplies can be
determined. Then, given the cost, damages arising out of the al
leged price-fixing conspiracy can be traced.
Secondly, unless the plaintiffs were allowed standing, no suits
against these suppliers could be brought. 106 The court recognized
that since the bids were based on a percentage mark-up, the con
99. Id.
100. Id. at 198.
101. Id.
102. [1973] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 94,981.
106. Id. at 94,978.

~

74,680 at 94,977 (D. Conn.).
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tractors suffered no harm because their profit margins were main
tained. Also, the court stated that the statute of limitations barred
suit by many of the contractors. The court recognized that for
these same reasons the fear of double recoveries against the de
fendants was hypothetical. 107
The third case cited by Congress, but in which standing was
denied, was Illinois v. Ampress Brick CO.108 This case is particu
larly important since on appeal to the Supreme Court, under the
name of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,109 it was used by the Court
to advance the direct purchaser rule. The Illinois Brick plaintiffs,
the State of Illinois and 700 other governmental entities, were indi
rect purchasers. 110 The state purchased cement blocks in the form
of buildings from its contractors. The contractors had in tum
bought the blocks from manufacturers for an illegally higher price.
The Ampress Brick court held that indirect purchasers of altered
goods did not have standing to sue. 111 The cement blocks were al
tered since they had been included with other construction materi
als in the completed buildings. 112 Since altered goods were also in
volved in Master Key, yet standing was granted,113 a closer ex
amination of the facts underlying the decision is necessary.
Critical to the court's decision was proof that only seven per
cent of the 700 plaintiffs were able to state the cost of the cement
blocks included in the buildings they bought. 114 None of the plain
tiffs alleged that the contracts were computed on the cost-plus or
percentage mark-up basis. l1s Of the 700 plaintiffs, only one offered
evidence as to the price of the blocks. That price was less than one
half of the percent of the total bid submitted. 116 The court was un
doubtedly affected by the uncertainty and complexity that would
have attended any proof of damages. Such reasoning would bring
Ampress Brick in line with the reasoning found in Master Key and
Liquid Asphalt. In the latter cases since the existence of cost-plus
or percentage mark-up contracts made damages readily ascertain
107. [d.
108. 67 F.RD. 461 (D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 1163 (7th CiL), rev'd sub
nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 431 U.S. at 720.
109. See notes 47-59 supra and accompanying text.
llO. 67 F.RD. at 463.
llI. Id.
ll2. Id. at 468.
ll3. See text accompanying notes 102-05 supra.
ll4. 431 U.S. at 727 n.6.
ll5. 67 F.RD. at 463.
ll6. 431 U.S. at 727.

96

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:81

able, standing was granted. In the former case, damages were in
definite and not susceptible to ready proof and standing was
denied.
The preceding cases delineate Congress' position on the stand
ing issue with regard to indirect purchasers. Where damages lend
themselves to ready proof, because of a cost-plus contract as in
Liquid Asphalt or a percentage mark-up contract as in Master Key,
standing should be granted. Where damages are speculative and
not readily ascertainable because costs cannot be traced through
contractual agreements, standing should be denied, as it was in
Ampress Brick. Congress also believes that since standing is a pre
liminary issue, consideration of the possibility of double recoveries
against the defendant should not weigh heavily in the standing de
cision. Furthermore, the statute of limitations may render such a
possibility moot as in Liquid Asphalt and Master Key. Lastly, Con
gress recognizes that unless indirect purchasers are granted stand
ing to sue, many antitrust violations will go unchallenged because
of the close relationship between violator and intermediary as in
Liquid Asphalt. It follows that, in addition to the threshold matters
of establishing an injury and an antitrust violation, Congress would
require only that damages be easily computed, . preferably through
contractual agreements.
The position of the Supreme Court with respect to indirect
purchasers was given in the appeal of the Ampress Brick case. The
Court held that only direct purchasers were injured within the
. meaning of section 4 and .that . indirect purchasers lacked standing
to sue. 117 Allowing indirect purchasers standing, the Court rea
soned, would present insurmountable problems of proof, delaying
litigation and undermining the effectiveness of the private enforce
ment mechanism. us
The Court recognized that the difficulties faced by indirect
purchasers with regard to proof of damages would not always exist.
In dicta, the Court expressed the opinion that where cost-plus con
tracts existed, allowing for ready determination of damages, the di
rect purchaser rule would not apply and indirect purchasers would
have standing.1 19 Consequently, where damages are specific and
readily amenable to proof, the Court presumably would be willing
to grant standing, as would Congress.

117. [d. at 736.
118. Id. See also notes 47-59 supra and accompanying text.
119. 431 U.S. at 732 n.12.
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Although the positions of Congress and the Supreme Court
are reconcilable, they are not in complete agreement. Both posi
tions would grant standing to indirect purchasers where damages
are specific and susceptible to ready proof because of contractual
agreements. The Supreme Court, though, finds that this situation
exists only where a cost-plus contract is present. 120 Congress' posi
tion is that a percentage mark-up contract as well as a cost-plus
contract makes damages readily provable. It should be recognized,
moreover, that these positions unduly restrict the standing of indi
rect purchasers. Since consumers usually make purchases through
intermediaries, not directly from antitrust violators, and without
the benefit of cost-plus or percentage mark-up contracts, it is upon
them that this rule impacts.
The Reiter decision, that consumer injuries are within the
business or property language of section 4 of the Clayton Act, 121
will be subject to the direct purchaser rule of Illinois Brick upon
remand of the case. 122 With Congress and the Supreme Court in
agreement that indirect purchasers should be denied standing, Rei
ter's cause of action will be lost. This result shows that the Su
preme Court granted nothing to the consumer through its ruling in
Reiter. Anything granted through the broad interpretation of busi
ness or property is lost through the indirect purchaser rule of Illi
nois Brick.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Standing was developed by the courts in an attempt to restrict
the availability of the judicial system to only meritorious claims. As
applied to section 4 of the Clayton Act, standing was developed to
avoid the strain on judicial resources resulting from antitrust suits
involving remote injuries with their negligible, speculative, and
unascertainable damages.
The Supreme Court apparently expanded consumer standing
under section 4 of the Clayton Act in Reiter v. Sonotone COrp.123
The Court held that a consumer who pays more for goods because
of antitrust violations is injured within the business or property
language of section 4. This broad grant of standing, however, is se
verely limited by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois .124 Illinois Brick held
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

[d. at 736.
442 U.S. at 342.
See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
442 U.S. at 330.
431 U.S. at 720.
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that a direct purchaser alone may be injured within the meaning of
section 4. Consumers, usually indirect purchasers since they make
their purchases from intermediary retailers, are foreclosed from the
section 4 remedy. Until the Illinois Brick case is overruled, the de
cision in Reiter grants nothing to consumers. With Congress' posi
tion on standing in line with Illinois Brick, this overruling of Illi
nois Brick cannot be expected.
Craig Y. Clark

